This paper examines the welfare-maximizing degree of patent protection in a growth model where the engines of economic growth are R&D and public services. We find that an increase in public services enhances the positive and negative effects of strengthening patent protection on R&D and the volume of production, respectively. However, if public services are relatively small, the negative welfare effect associated with the decrease in production volume tends to outweigh the positive welfare effect from the increase in the growth rate, and so the welfare-maximizing degree of patent protection tends to be lower. This result provides one possible explanation for why developing countries tend to prefer weaker patent protection.
Introduction
Since the Agreement on TRIPs, patent protection has strengthened in both developing and developed countries. According to Park (2008) , however, in many developing countries, including African countries and some Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand and Indonesia, the indices of patent protection remain relatively low. 1 The purpose of this paper is to examine why most developing countries do not prefer stronger patent protection.
It is commonly thought that developing countries are unwilling to strengthen patent protection because it impedes the domestic use of technologies created by developed countries. To consider this effect of patent protection, many early studies examine the effects of strengthening patent protection in NorthSouth two-country models where technologies typically transfer from developed to developing countries (Gustafsson and Segerstrom 2011 , Iwaisako et al. 2011 , and Tanaka and Iwaisako 2012 . On the other hand, infrastructure services exert a strong impact on the productivity of private inputs and the rate of return on capital, as discussed in Agénor and Moreno-Dodson (2006) , and these also have a significant impact on the effects of strengthening patent protection. Thus, we anticipate that differences in infrastructure services can play an important role in explaining differences in the degree of patent protection.
Hence, this paper focuses on the role of public services supplied by governments as the main reason for the differences in the strength of patent protection commonly found across countries.
By introducing productive public spending into a variety expansion-type R&D-based growth model following Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991), we construct a model where both R&D and public services are the engines of economic growth. By examining the welfare-maximizing degree of patent protection, we show that a country that can maintain only a lower level of public services prefers weaker patent protection as long as the ratio of public services to output is not too high. 2 This result then explains why developing countries prefer the weaker protection of patents. In addition, this result is also consistent with the empirical evidence; we identify a positive correlation between the ratio of government spending to GDP and an index of patent protection as also shown in Figure 1 . 3 1 The values of the patent protection indices in Thailand and Indonesia were 2.66 and 2.77 in 2005, while in most OECD countries these same values exceed 4.
2 In fact, we find a small but positive correlation between per capita GDP and the ratio of government spending to GDP, as also shown in Appendix A. 3 The data source for the ratio of government spending to GDP is the United Nations' National Accounts Main Aggregates Database, while the data source for the index of patent protection is Park (2008) . The latest data for the index of patent protection are for 2005 and thus we use the 2005 data. We obtain data for both variables for 118 countries. The scatterplot in Figure 1 depicts the relation between the ratio of government spending to GDP and index of patent protection for 118 countries in 2005, for which we can easily discern a positive correlation. 
One unit of labor produces one unit of each intermediate good and a single firm holding the patent monopolistically supplies each intermediate good. Now we must consider how governments protect patents. Generally, governments control the degree of patent protection through patent length and breadth. However, for simplicity, we assume that the patent length is fixed and infinite and that governments control the degree of patent protection using only patent breadth. 4 Following Goh and Olivier and the stock value of a firm producing one intermediate good, we obtain the R&D equilibrium condition as follows: Î Ø Next, we consider the equilibrium condition of the stock value of a firm (the price of the patent). Here we assume that the profit of firms is taxed at rate . As discussed below, the tax revenue is spent on public services. If households possess one unit of stock in the time interval Ø, they can obtain a profit of´½ µ Ø Ø and a capital gain or a loss of Î Ø . Alternatively, they can invest Î Ø units of funds in a risk-free asset, and obtain Ö Ø Î Ø , where Ö Ø is the interest rate of the risk-free asset. Therefore, in equilibrium, the no-arbitrage condition must hold as follows:
The economy consists of a unit continuum of identical households, each of which consists of Ä consumers. Each consumer inelastically supplies one unit of labor at each time point. The lifetime utility of the household is given by Í Ê ½ ¼ Ø ÐÒ Ø Ø where Ø is per capita consumption and is the subjective discount rate. We assume that both labor income and corporate income are taxed at the rate .
The intertemporal budget constraint is given by
µÛ Ø Ø where Ö Ø is the interest rate, ¼ is the initial per capita asset holdings, and Û Ø denotes the wage.
The necessary condition for the maximization of the household's utility is given by the following Euler equation:
We assume that the government provides public services, Ø , to keep the ratio of public services to output constant at (that is, Ø Ø ) and that the budget for the government balances at each point of time. As discussed, the government collects tax revenues by imposing taxes on labor and corporate income at the constant rate of ; that is, the tax revenue is ´Û Ø Ä · Ø AE Ø µ Ø . Thus, the tax rate equals the public services-output ratio; that is, .
The market equilibrium path
In this section, we derive the market equilibrium path in this economy.
To start with, we derive the equilibrium allocation of labor. From (1) and (3), we obtain This shows that the reduced-form production function is of an Ã structure, and thus, the ratio of 5 consumption to the number of invented goods is constant on the equilibrium path in the present model.
Here, we let Ø denote the ratio; that is, Ø Ø AE Ø . Consequently, the growth rate and the ratio of aggregate consumption to the number of invented goods are given by 5 
µ
and
Before conducting the welfare analysis, we examine how strengthening patent protection affects economic growth and the consumption level. First, we can show that strengthening patent protection enhances economic growth, as follows:
Strengthening patent protection lowers average productivity Ø AE Ø « ½ « ´¬µ. However, the positive effect obtained through increasing profit overwhelms this negative effect. 6 We also show that strengthening patent protection reduces the ratio of consumption to the number of invented goods, as follows:
where we use the fact that , and the consumption-reducing effect, ¬ . An increase in the public services-output ratio, , has two opposing effects, as shown in Barro (1990) . That is, while it increases productivity and output, it also raises the tax rate, weakens the incentive for R&D, and thereby reduces after-tax income. Therefore, both the growth rate and the ratio of consumption to the number of invented goods display an inverted-U shape with respect to , as we can see from (5) and (6) . Put strictly, if the public services-output ratio is so low that «, an increase in the public services-output ratio increases both the growth rate and the ratio of consumption to the number of invented goods; otherwise, an increase in reduces both.
Furthermore, inspecting (7) and (8), we can easily see that if the public services-output ratio is lower (higher) than «, increasing the public services-output ratio enhances (weakens) both the growthenhancing effect and the consumption-reducing effect proportionally. 5 See Appendix B for a detailed derivation. 6 See Appendix C for the proof and property of ´¬µ.
4 Welfare-maximizing patent policy
We can easily calculate the lifetime utility as a function of patent breadth, ¬. 
As shown in Appendix D, we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 1 If the public services-output ratio is low (high) such that
« ( « ),
an increase in the public services-output ratio raises (reduces) the welfare-maximizing degree of patent protection.
We can understand the reason for this result by using the welfare-maximizing condition (9), as follows.
We focus on the case where « : that is, an increase in raises both the growth rate and the ratio of consumption to the number of invented goods. 9 The increase in strengthens both the growth-enhancing effect and the consumption-reducing effect of strengthening patent protection. However, these positive and negative effects are proportional, as discussed in the previous section, and therefore, the ratio of the two effects ¬ ¬ does not depend on . Consequently, the increase in has no impact on the RHS of (9) . On the other hand, as shown in
, the marginal utility of the level of consumption is diminishing while the marginal utility of the growth rate is constant. The increase in thus reduces the marginal utility of , ½ and weakens the consumption-reducing effect. As a result, an increase in raises the welfare-maximizing degree of patent protection.
From the proposition, a country with a high level of public services prefers stronger patent protection unless the public services-output ratio is so high that «. Conversely, a poor country that cannot maintain a high level of public services prefers weaker patent protection. This result may then explain why patent protection in many developing countries is relatively weak. On the other hand, and as shown in Park (2008) , some rapidly growing countries, such as China and Vietnam, have strengthened patent protection since 1990. Using the results from the present model, we can explain this tendency as follows.
Because of economic development, these countries have become able to maintain a high level of public 7 The economy jumps to the balanced growth path at time 0 so that AE¼ is exogenously given at time 0. 8 We can prove that the welfare function is concave in patent breadth as shown in Appendix E. 9 Using 2010 data (the most recent available in the United Nations' National Accounts Main Aggregates Database), we find that the ratio of government spending is less than 0.3 in most countries. We also confirm this tendency in 2005, as shown in Figure 1 . In the present model, we consider « as the capital share, and thus « is the empirically relevant case.
7 services, and thus their welfare-maximizing patent protection has increased in strength. 10 Moreover, the TRIPs agreement provides developing countries with an extension of time for strengthening patent protection, for which the result in this paper provides something of a rationale.
Appendix A: Data on ratio of government spending to GDP and per capita
GDP
In this appendix, in order to observe the actual relation between per capita GDP and the ratio of government spending to GDP, we provide data for these variables in Figure 2 . We use the 2010 data because they are the most recent data available in the United Nations' National Accounts Main Aggregates Database.
We identify a small but positive correlation between these variables. (9) is a decreasing function of ¬.
is a decreasing function of ¬ and the left-hand side (LHS) of (9) is an increasing function of ¬.
Therefore, (9) determines the welfare-maximizing patent breadth uniquely, as depicted in Figure 3 .
Using Figure 3 , we now examine how an increase in the public services-output ratio affects the welfare-maximizing patent breadth. First, an increase in has no impact on the ratio of the growthenhancing effect to the consumption-reducing effect, ¬ ¬
, and thus the curve remains unchanged.
Second, we consider the impact of on . As mentioned, an increase in the public services-output ratio affects the ratio of consumption to the number of invented goods in opposite ways. If «
